

THE BATTLE FRONT IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

April 25, 1945

Comrades,

This Seventh National Congress of our Party¹⁰⁶ is being held at a time when the great Chinese people have waged their heroic War of Resistance Against Japan for nearly eight years. I feel it a great honour to speak to our Party Congress for the more than **900,000** men belonging to the Eighth Route Army,⁵² the New Fourth Army⁹⁰ and the South China Anti-Japanese Column¹⁵⁴ and the more than two million militiamen — anti-Japanese heroes all. There is one thing I ought to say at the start: that during these eight years our splendid Chinese people have formed a national united front against Japan. All the people, men and women, young and old, have been waging a tremendous, life-and-death struggle against the invaders on all fronts. No matter how brutal and ruthless the Japanese invaders have been, no matter how mistaken the policies of the Kuomintang government and its supreme command, the Chinese people have doggedly carried on this great patriotic war, brushing aside all obstacles. There can be no doubt that the Chinese people will achieve final victory. During these eight years, our great people's armies — the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column — have fought shoulder to shoulder with all other anti-Japanese forces in defence of our motherland. And, alongside the rest of the Chinese people, we Communists have shed our blood unsparingly on battle fronts in the Liberated Areas in north, central and south China. We Chinese Communists can proudly claim to be the best sons and daugh-

Comrade Zhu De delivered this military report at the Seventh National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. He reviewed its text and made some revisions in 1953, when the People's Publishing House in Beijing put out a third edition of it in booklet form.

ters of our nation because we have upheld the Chinese people's most heartfelt cause; and we shall steadfastly continue to do so.

I want to take this opportunity to pay homage to the memory of the soldiers of all the armed forces throughout the country who gave their lives in the War of Resistance Against Japan, to the memory of all members of the Communist Party and all other compatriots who made the supreme sacrifice for the anti-Japanese cause.

I should like to extend heartfelt greetings to all our countrymen fighting on the anti-Japanese fronts in China, to the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the South China Anti-Japanese Column and the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.¹⁵⁵

Comrades! This congress is meeting to review the experience of the War of Resistance, and to prepare ourselves to work in ever-closer co-operation and common struggle with the entire Chinese people and all friendly forces fighting the Japanese, in order to bring this war to final victory. I am in full agreement with the political report entitled "On Coalition Government" made by the leader of our Party, Comrade Mao Zedong. It is a great historic document, which embodies and sums up the experience gained in the Chinese people's bitter struggle for independence, freedom, democracy, unity and prosperity. It proposes a specific programme and practical measures for defeating the Japanese invaders and for building a new China. It maps a road that, followed by our Party and the whole Chinese people, will lead to victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and shape the destiny of post-war China.

Without a correct political policy there can be no correct military policy. The people's war can achieve victory only if its course is guided by a correct political policy and only if it is conducted by a democratic coalition government with the people as the mainstay. For eight years now our great people's armies — the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column — have waged a war of unparalleled heroism, fought bitter yet magnificent and triumphant battles, and become the leading force in China's anti-Japanese war. They have been able to do so because the political and military policies of Comrade Mao Zedong are correct. The application of his correct political policy in combination with his correct military policy has brought about the following: the creation of the armed forces of the people; the establishment of the Liberated Areas; the organization of a democratic coalition government based on the

“three thirds system”;⁸⁸ and the waging of a genuine people’s war in the Liberated Areas. All of this has enabled us to win one great victory after another on the battle fronts in the Liberated Areas. Now, as we prepare ourselves for nationwide victory in the War of Resistance, we must likewise follow the principles given in Comrade Mao Zedong’s political report and act on the guidance provided by his general political policy. It would be an obvious mistake to divorce military from political affairs, to discuss military affairs solely from the military point of view. The military report I am submitting to our Seventh Party Congress is based, in spirit and policy, on the political report by Comrade Mao Zedong.

I. EIGHT YEARS OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

Comrades! As I said earlier, we have waged the War of Resistance Against Japan for nearly eight years. During these eight years, the military situation has undergone complex changes. However complex, the developments have not gone beyond what Comrade Mao Zedong scientifically predicted in his *On Protracted War*. That is, that the War of Resistance would be marked by three stages: the enemy’s offensive; stalemate; and our counter-offensive. We have not yet passed through them all, for we are just about to enter the third.

The first stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan began with the July 7th Incident of 1937⁵⁹ and ended with the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. During this stage, the Kuomintang authorities were compelled to turn from non-resistance to resistance, and to adopt certain progressive measures in domestic policy. They were forced to do this as a result of the all-out offensive by Japanese imperialism, the growing demand for resistance from the entire Chinese people, and particularly our Party’s insistence on the formation of a national united front against Japan. During this period, quite a number of Kuomintang troops and forces under the provincial authorities put up active resistance to the invaders at the front, even though other Kuomintang units did not do so but fled in panic the moment they encountered the enemy. The change in policy pursued by the Kuomintang authorities at that time was welcomed and supported by us Communists and by the Chinese people as a whole. Unfortunately, the change did not go far enough. At the very start of the War of Resistance, our Party’s

Central Committee pointed out that without a people's war, a total war, it would be impossible to win the war against Japanese invasion. But because the Kuomintang authorities persisted in maintaining their anti-popular regime and standpoint, they were incapable of waging such a people's war — a situation the Japanese invaders took great advantage of to attack us. It was, in fact, by taking advantage of this weakness on the battle front in the Kuomintang areas that in a mere 15 months, the invaders were able to occupy Guangzhou and Wuhan and swallow up a large part of north and central China as well as key areas in south China. Of course the Japanese, too, have many weak points. The war they are waging is imperialist, aggressive, barbarous and unjust, and therefore theirs is an unpopular cause. Japanese imperialism has inherent weaknesses, and its manpower, military strength and financial and material resources are all inadequate. The calculations of the Japanese imperialists were one-sided. They considered only the strength of the Kuomintang authorities and overlooked the fighting will and strength of the great Chinese people and their armies — the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. Because of their weaknesses, the Japanese aggressors have to employ a principle in deployment and command that requires them to use their troops in a dispersed and piecemeal way. Although a powerful enemy, the Japanese aggressors are by no means invincible. Their weaknesses should have been exploited by the Kuomintang. Unfortunately, they were not. On the other hand, the Kuomintang's own major weakness — its one-party dictatorship — was exploited by the Japanese. The political system that militated against the people, with its defeatist reliance on defence, was such that within the first 15 months the several million troops under Kuomintang command suffered tremendous losses. This stupid strategy prevented those officers and men who did put up a heroic fight at the front from achieving the victories they deserved.

By contrast, it was in this first stage that our great people's armies — the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies — advanced in a direction opposite to that of Japanese attack and penetrated to areas in the enemy's rear. This move represented our counter-attack during the enemy's strategic offensive. While the enemy was attacking and the Kuomintang army was beating a mass retreat, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies launched counter-attacks behind enemy lines with unparalleled heroism and won victory after victory. They tied the enemy down, established strategic bases, created Liberated Areas and

raised the fighting morale of the whole Chinese people. Thus facts disproved the theory of national subjugation and demonstrated that a war waged by the people will surely triumph in the end. They also proved that the idea of our winning a quick victory was likewise erroneous. When the enemy is strong and we are weak, we must pursue a people's war to gradually turn the tide. That is why our War of Resistance is a protracted war.

The 15 months of the first stage of this war witnessed great changes in China as well as among the Japanese invaders. From the standpoint of resistance to Japan, the Kuomintang authorities had no good reason to be unhappy that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies successfully opened new fronts and recovered vast stretches of lost territory in the enemy's rear. And yet they were. In fact, they were most annoyed. After the fall of Wuhan, they changed their policy. They changed to a policy of passive resistance to Japan but active opposition to the Communist Party and the people. On the Japanese side, the invaders had succeeded in occupying such large areas in our country that the last thing they expected was to encounter such powerful opponents as the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in north and central China. Our recovery of so many of the places they had occupied was like pushing a dagger into their heart. As a result, the Japanese, too, changed their policy. They stopped attacking the Kuomintang fronts, contenting themselves with inducing the Kuomintang authorities to surrender. On the other hand, they focused their "mopping-up" campaigns on the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. We thus entered the stage of strategic stalemate. One thing is certain: With the enemy advancing and the Kuomintang forces defeated and retreating, this stage could never have been reached without the counter-attacks launched by our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

The second stage — strategic stalemate — began, as I have said, after the fall of Wuhan. Characteristic of this phase were the recurring waves of furious attacks by the enemy and fierce counter-attacks by troops in the Liberated Areas. What we mean by stalemate is that the enemy and our troops in the Liberated Areas fought each other to a virtual standstill. The truth is that the main Japanese forces in China were tied down in the fight against the Liberated Areas for the whole five and a half years from the fall of Wuhan in October 1938 till 1944, when they once more launched a strategic offensive on the Kuomintang battle front. Up to 1943, 64 per cent of all the Japanese forces in China and 95 per cent of all puppet troops were pinned down in the

Liberated Areas. During this entire period, not a single major battle was fought against the Kuomintang. These are the facts about the strategic stalemate stage.

The war launched from the Liberated Areas has been a great people's war, total in the true sense of the term. The incomparable doggedness and heroism displayed by the people of the Liberated Areas during this stage of the war will remain forever a glorious chapter in the history of the Chinese nation. If there had been no front in the Liberated Areas, if the fighting there had not been carried out over a long period under the most difficult conditions and finally reached a stalemate, the enemy would have continued to advance into southwest and northwest China; the Kuomintang, with its whole political machine and army directed against the people, would have been utterly incapable of halting the enemy's advance. In that case, there could have been no stage of stalemate, the situation in the War of Resistance would long since have become dreadful to conceive. After the fall of Wuhan, particularly, the Kuomintang authorities made the mistake of shifting the emphasis from external to internal problems. They became passive in conducting the War of Resistance and active in opposing the Communist Party and the people. They launched three anti-Communist onslaughts.¹⁵⁶ And their attack on the New Fourth Army during the Southern Anhui Incident¹⁵⁷ was a particularly heinous crime of theirs. If the Chinese people had failed to hold this onslaught in check and stem the tide of reaction, there would have been no Liberated Areas, no protracted fighting ending in stalemate and no possibility of sustaining the War of Resistance. The sweeping victories won by the Japanese during their renewed attacks on the Kuomintang areas in 1944 proved this beyond the shadow of a doubt. Moreover, had the strength of the Liberated Areas not been such a formidable obstacle to the capitulation and compromise to which the Kuomintang government was prone, the recurrent danger of capitulation could not have been avoided. Then the War of Resistance would have petered out prematurely. Facts, experience and enemy documents all prove this, but censorship imposed by the Kuomintang has prevented its becoming known to many people outside the Liberated Areas.

During these long five and a half years, there was ample opportunity for the Kuomintang government to prepare a counter-offensive and try to push ahead. Instead, it launched the three anti-Communist onslaughts. Instead of strengthening the anti-Japanese forces, it attempted to weaken them. Instead of taking a bold line in the War of

Resistance, it adopted the slogan, "Save the nation by a devious path", and flirted with the enemy. As a consequence, the Kuomintang troops in the enemy's rear could not stand the strain. They either failed to hold their own or became puppet troops of the Japanese. When in 1944 the invaders launched a series of attacks to open up lines of communication on the mainland, vast Kuomintang-held territories in Henan, Hunan, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces quickly fell into their hands. This created the most critical situation in the Kuomintang areas since the War of Resistance began. By contrast, it was at this time, when the Kuomintang was incapable of putting up any effective resistance to the enemy, that our forces in the Liberated Areas, having surmounted the severe difficulties of 1941-42, launched their own vigorous counter-attacks. When the enemy attacked the Kuomintang, we attacked the enemy from our fronts in the Liberated Areas. Thus, in 1944 we entered a second phase in the strategic stalemate.

Consequently, it is clear to every one that the Kuomintang authorities have left undone those things they ought to have done, and vigorously done those things they ought not to have. As a result, the Kuomintang armies have grown weaker and weaker. In the Liberated Areas, however, the position is precisely the reverse: In the course of fighting, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column have become progressively stronger. They have recovered vast areas of lost territory, overcome their most serious difficulties, and as a result are now entering a new stage of growth. The centre of the War of Resistance is now on the front of the Liberated Areas, not on that of the Kuomintang.

As a result of the Chinese people's eight-year struggle, of the great Soviet army's triumphant march into fascist Germany and that country's imminent total collapse, of the successes of the American and British troops in the Far East (here the efforts of the American people require special mention) and also of the decisive position held in the Far East by the Soviet Union following its abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact,¹⁵⁸ there is no room for doubt that our War of Resistance is now about to enter the third stage, that of general counter-offensive.

How is this general counter-offensive to be prepared and launched? In his political report Comrade Mao Zedong discussed all the political aspects. The only point I wish to make here is that the prolonged, heroic fighting of the people of the Liberated Areas, combined with their constructive efforts in other fields, has laid the foun-

dition for this general counter-offensive on the Chinese mainland and provided its finest preparation. I said a little while back that, had it not been for the fact that military operations in the Liberated Areas protected the Kuomintang-controlled areas and long held up an enemy attack, the situation throughout China would be quite different. In the coming counter-offensive, the battle front of the Liberated Areas will be the strategic starting point as well as the foremost strategic base. In the Liberated Areas, there is an immense concentration of manpower (about 1 million regular troops, more than 2 million militia-men and nearly 10 million members of the self-defence corps); vast material resources have been preserved and developed (we have produced a considerable amount of foodstuffs and are operating public, private and home handicraft industries); there is a special geographical situation (large cities, railways and a long stretch of coastline occupied by the Japanese are encircled or dominated by the Liberated Areas); and we hold important strategic points (the mountainous regions and plains of north China and the central China plains are terrain favourable for our counter-offensive and, furthermore, north China is an important gateway to northeast China and Inner Mongolia). On top of all this, there are two other factors: the militant will of the people in the Liberated Areas derived from the tempering of protracted war, and the creation, through democracy in the Liberated Areas, of political conditions favourable to the launching of a general counter-offensive. It would be a gross blunder for anyone to overlook the signal achievements made on the battle front of the Liberated Areas or to fail to take into account the more than 90 million people heroically fighting there, and thus overlook the enormous significance of the Liberated Areas to the cause of the Chinese people's liberation and the common cause of the anti-fascist Allies.⁸⁹

I shall now speak in some detail about the battle front of the Liberated Areas.

II. THE BATTLE FRONT OF THE LIBERATED AREAS

OPENING THE FRONTS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out in his report that "from the very beginning there have been two fronts in China's War of Re-

sistance, the Kuomintang front and the front of the Liberated Areas". This is a special feature of that war. The battle front of the Liberated Areas was created by the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column, on whom fell the unique responsibility of conducting the War of Resistance.

The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column are the armed forces of the Chinese people and successors to the Chinese Red Army. When our Party and Comrade Mao Zedong created this great people's army, they, embodying the will of the Chinese people, defined its sacred mission as service to the people and defence of the motherland, and defined its aim as the liberation of the Chinese nation and the Chinese people. Ever since the September 18th Incident,⁵⁸ this great people's army, roused to bitter indignation by the desecration of Chinese territory, has been straining to come to grips with the Japanese invaders. For several years, during which we waged many arduous and bloody struggles and completed the Long March, this army tried by every possible means to end the civil war and to fight as one against the Japanese invaders. On reaching the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, it made substantial preparations for the War of Resistance: the joining of forces by the three front armies of the Red Army,¹⁵⁹ the peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident,¹⁶⁰ the training of personnel and the establishment of contacts with many friendly forces all over China. All this was well done. Having learned about the outbreak of the July 7th Incident, the Central Committee of our Party issued, on the very second day, an appeal for resistance to Japan,¹⁶¹ and all officers and men of our great people's army demanded that they be sent to the anti-Japanese front. Not long afterwards, this people's army appeared on the front line of the war against Japan.

In September 1937, the Eighth Route Army, following the brilliant strategy worked out by Comrade Mao Zedong, marched to the enemy's rear in north China. Our 115th Division entered the Shanxi-Qahar-Hebei area; the 120th Division, northwestern Shanxi; and the 129th Division, southeastern Shanxi. In 1938, our army advanced further east, one part to the Hebei-Shandong-Henan plain and the Hebei-Shandong plain, another to the central Hebei plain, and yet another went still farther, reaching eastern Hebei to support the great anti-Japanese uprising, in which 200,000 people took part.¹⁶² The New Fourth Army opened its front soon after the Eighth Route Army, in the spring of 1938. It penetrated the enemy's rear in central China

and started guerrilla warfare against the Japanese on both banks of the Changjiang River. In the winter of the same year, the Dongjiang Column in Guangdong Province started an uprising in the Dongjiang area after the fall of Guangzhou. In 1939, when Qiongya (Hainan Island) fell, the local people, led by our Party, organized guerrilla forces to fight the Japanese. In its first engagement with the enemy at Pingxingguan, the Eighth Route Army achieved the first total victory in the national War of Resistance.⁹⁶

After the September 18th Incident, our Party systematically organized resistance to the Japanese in Beiping, Tianjin, Nanjing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Hongkong, Guangzhou and other large cities and in wide areas of the countryside, winning the goodwill of the people. Although such activities were ruthlessly suppressed throughout the civil war, the seeds of resistance to Japan spread in many places by our Party took firm root among the people and developed into a great potential force, no matter how difficult the situation. Worthy of special mention is the December 9th Movement of 1935,¹⁶³ which, led by our Party, played an important part in accelerating armed resistance to Japanese aggression. After north and central China fell into enemy hands, our local Party organizations worked with the people of all strata to organize armed uprisings or arrange for withdrawal to the countryside in order to foster wide-ranging anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear. Large numbers of young intellectuals and working people joined our army. In Shanxi Province, a League of Self-Sacrifice for National Salvation¹⁶⁴ and a "Daredevil" Corps were organized around refugee students from Beiping and Tianjin. This "Daredevil" Corps later became the New Army of Shanxi Province,¹⁶⁵ and we gave it our fraternal support. In central Hebei, an anti-Japanese detachment organized by the Hui people¹⁶⁶ joined the Eighth Route Army. We also gave energetic support to many other armed forces fighting the Japanese. These local units combined with the people's armies (the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies) to form a strong anti-Japanese force.

In this way, the war effort in north and central China, having collapsed following the disastrous defeat of the Kuomintang army, was quickly revived by our Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in co-operation with the people. Areas in the enemy's rear were transformed into front lines in the War of Resistance.

In this way, the purely defensive warfare sustained by the Kuomin-

tang before its retreat was replaced by people's guerrilla warfare led by the Communist Party behind enemy lines.

In this way, vast territories that had been lost by the Kuomintang and had fallen under despotic Japanese rule were, one by one, recovered and turned into huge Liberated Areas — the three Liberated Areas of north, central and south China — full of hope and promise. "The rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen", a Chinese proverb goes. Every Chinese has the duty of recovering territory lost by the Kuomintang. That is exactly what we have been doing.

In this way, from the early period of the War of Resistance Against Japan a considerable number of the Japanese invaders had been tied down on the battlefields of the Liberated Areas and prevented from making an all-out advance westward. Later, these areas became the main battle front in the war against Japan.

In this way, the battle front of the Liberated Areas assumed decisive strategic importance and became the focus of the War of Resistance. The reactionaries' shameless plan to use the Japanese invaders to wipe out the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies (a plot of "using others to eliminate one's own adversaries") came to grief.

These are the achievements of the people's army, the people's war and the incomparable people's strategy of Comrade Mao Zedong.

THREE PERIODS IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Between the Pingxingguan victory in September 1937 and the great Hundred-Regiment campaign in 1940,⁹⁷ the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies began to thwart the "mopping-up" tactics of the Japanese expeditionary forces, who attacked a point by closing in from all directions. From 1939 onwards, our armies broke, one after another, every enemy attempt to apply new tactics devised by the Japanese commanding general, Tomobumi Yamashita,¹⁶⁷ and the Japanese divisional commander, Kuwaki. These combined, as they put it, "blockade, dismemberment and mopping-up". Our successive victories resulted in the creation of Liberated Areas in north and central China. The Eighth Route Army grew from a force in five figures to 400,000 men and the population of the Liberated Areas grew to some 40 million. The New Fourth Army grew from 12,000 to 100,000

and liberated a population of 13 million. This, then, was the period of the creation and expansion of Liberated Areas in the enemy's rear.

In the autumn of 1940, alarmed by the resounding victory of the Eighth Route Army's Hundred-Regiment campaign, the enemy dismissed the commander-in-chief of his expeditionary force in north China and appointed Yasuji Okamura. Japanese plans for attacking our army were thoroughly overhauled and the establishment of "a New Order in Greater East Asia"⁶⁸ was proposed. In addition, to prepare for the Pacific war,¹⁶⁸ the enemy reaffirmed his aggressive intention, first announced in 1939, of effectively safeguarding "the rear-service bases of the Greater East Asian War" in north China. To achieve this, the Japanese invaders concentrated their forces for "total warfare" — military, economic and cultural as well as through espionage — against the Liberated Areas in north China. The methods they employed in the "mopping-up" campaigns were "iron-ring encirclement, surprise attack, mopping-up in length and breadth, lightning tip-and-run raids, and repeated combing-out". Wherever the enemy set foot, they burned and killed with the utmost ruthlessness, attempting to create a wasteland and destroy all means of sustenance for our army. The Japanese invaders often employed some hundred thousand troops against a single locality in their repeated "mopping-up" campaigns. Each campaign lasted as long as three or four months. This led to an extremely serious situation, particularly since famine broke out at that time in various parts of north China and both the army and the people were forced to exist on tree leaves and grass roots. But despite this, our army united with the people and waged a stubborn and heroic struggle. During this period, which lasted till 1942, the Liberated Areas shrank and their population fell to less than 50 million and the Eighth Route Army was reduced to 300,000 men. In the Central China Liberated Area, while the number of engagements was second only to that in north China, the New Fourth Army managed to grow in strength. Although our army as a whole and our population in the Liberated Areas decreased in number in this difficult period, their quality was steeled in battle. The Japanese invaders' "mopping-up" tactics were limited, but our army's measures of countering them were legion. During this period, we forged an even closer bond with the people and, as a result, learned many methods that enabled us to maintain our struggle against a powerful enemy and eventually defeat him. In this way, the Eighth Route and

New Fourth Armies successfully survived this most difficult period in the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas.

In the winter of 1942, our work in the various Liberated Areas of southern, central and eastern Hebei Province began to revive, and the Liberated Areas in north China grew again. The anti-Japanese war in the Liberated Areas entered its third period. The Japanese invaders tried to maintain the savage “mopping-up” campaign they had begun earlier that year. But our army advanced as the enemy advanced and penetrated deep into his rear to open up new Liberated Areas and break the enemy attack. This strategy was most effective, and the Liberated Areas grew even faster than at the beginning of the war. During this period, in response to the great rectification movement¹⁶⁹ and the great production campaign started in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region by the Party Central Committee, the various other Liberated Areas swung into action, with magnificent results. The campaign to reduce rent and interest¹⁷⁰ progressed in many places, so that the masses became even more eager to fight the Japanese. The establishment of the new-democratic government, a coalition government based on the “three thirds system”, further strengthened unity in the Liberated Areas. From the military point of view, the continuous growth of the main force and local units and the widespread mobilization of the people’s militia reinforced the Liberated Areas. As a result, they attained an unprecedented strength.

Early in the first period, the relationship was fairly good between the Kuomintang troops in the enemy’s rear and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. But after the fall of Wuhan when the Kuomintang reactionaries launched an anti-Communist policy and, in particular, promulgated restrictions against what they termed an “alien party” and an “alien army”,¹⁷¹ these Kuomintang troops actively opposed the Communist Party and the people and collaborated with the Japanese invaders in attacking the Liberated Areas, thus serving to actively wreck the battle front of these areas. However, in the second period, because of their activities against the people, the several hundred thousand Kuomintang troops in the enemy’s rear could not withstand the Japanese “mopping-up” campaigns and in 1941 they were defeated in the Zhongtiao Mountains. In 1942, the Kuomintang troops in Zhejiang and Jiangxi disintegrated, and in 1943 those in Shandong Province collapsed. All this proved that anti-popular armies could not hold their own in the rear of the enemy. From 1941 onwards, Kuomintang troops behind the enemy lines began to surrender in

large numbers. By the third period, after Pang Bingxun¹⁷² and Sun Dianying¹⁷³ went over to the enemy, nearly half a million Kuomintang troops and some 70 generals followed suit. This resulted in swelling the puppet army and helped the enemy intensify his “mop-ping-up” campaigns against the Liberated Areas.

GLORIOUS SACRIFICES, GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS

Comrades! So far I have dealt with the establishment of the front in the Liberated Areas and the different phases it went through. It is clear that, in this protracted war, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army, the South China Anti-Japanese Column, the people of the Liberated Areas and the Communists have suffered and made sacrifices far too numerous to detail here. Indeed I do not intend to detail them. But I do want to quote you some rough figures to show what the Chinese people have gained from these bitter battles and heavy sacrifices.

In the seven and a half years from September 1937 to March 1945, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column fought more than 115,000 battles, large and small, killed or wounded more than 960,000 and captured more than 280,000 Japanese and puppet troops. On top of this, more than 100,000 were persuaded to surrender and come over to our side. All told, the losses sustained by the Japanese and puppet troops amounted to more than 1.36 million men. (Statistics are not available for the South China Anti-Japanese Column prior to 1943.)

The main booty captured by our army comprised 1,028 pieces of artillery, more than 7,700 machine-guns and more than 430,000 rifles and carbines. We captured more than 34,000 blockhouses and more than 11,000 strongholds.

Before the battle of the Central China Plains in 1944, as I mentioned in the first part of this report, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column were engaging 64 per cent of the Japanese invading forces in China and 95 per cent of the puppet troops. Even today, out of the 40 Japanese divisions numbering some 580,000 men (Japanese forces in northeast China not included), 22½ divisions numbering 320,000 and representing 56 per cent of the Japanese troops in China are engaged by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese

Column. As far as the puppet troops are concerned, the situation remains unchanged. The fact that the Japanese invaders have stationed a large number of troops in north and central China explains the increasingly difficult task of our armies in the War of Resistance.

Even enemy disclosures reflect these remarkable achievements in the people's war against Japan. For example, in June 1943, the General Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Army in North China issued a communique stating: "From January to May of this year, our army fought 5,524 engagements with a Communist army of 567,424 men." Its year-end communique reported:

"The greater part of the enemy are not Chiang Kai-shek's but Communist troops. Of our 15,000 engagements this year, 75 per cent were with Communist troops. And of the 2 million enemy troops we fought, more than half were Communist. Of the 199,000 bodies found on the battlefields, half were Chinese Communist troops. But of the 74,000 prisoners we captured, Chinese Communist troops formed only 15 per cent. This reveals the inferior calibre of Chiang's troops, and at the same time testifies to the growing fighting spirit of the Chinese Communist troops. . . . Therefore, the Imperial Army in north China from now on will have to take on an increasingly important task. Its vital mission is to annihilate the Chinese Communist troops — our deadly enemy in north China."

Is it not crystal clear that the accomplishments along the front of the Liberated Areas are those of an all-out people's war?

Is it not crystal clear that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column and the people of the Liberated Areas, by their unparalleled, heroic resistance, by their matchless fortitude despite bitter hardships and heavy sacrifices, have displayed the most valour and produced the most heroic and immortal epic of the Chinese nation in the War of Resistance Against Japan?

Because of such great sacrifices, the Chinese people have gained the following: They have created the Liberated Areas, which extend over 19 provinces in north, central and south China and have a total population of 95.5 million.

Our Eighth Route Army, New Fourth Army and South China Anti-Japanese Column number 910,000 regulars, and there are more than 2.2 million militiamen. These figures bespeak the great development of the people's war in the Liberated Areas, in sharp contrast to the disastrous defeats suffered by the Kuomintang troops in theirs.

This strength of the Liberated Areas represents the strength of the whole Chinese people. Because of it the Chinese people now have great prospects of victory and democracy and a brilliant future.

EXPERIENCE GAINED BY THE LIBERATED AREAS IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

People may ask: How can the Liberated Areas, in the midst of the most cruel fighting, grow stronger every day, despite the fact that our armies are short of weapons — especially modern weapons — and receive no outside assistance, and despite the fact that their flanks are exposed to pincer attacks by the Kuomintang reactionaries? The section in Comrade Mao Zedong's report on the people's war provides the answer. Here I shall say a little more about our experience in this connection.

What has the general experience been? In a nutshell, it is that, led by our Party and in line with Comrade Mao Zedong's policy of people's war, we have practised Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles and the New Democracy in the Liberated Areas. As a consequence, we have been able to mobilize the people in the Liberated Areas to pursue the War of Resistance, to create a democratic coalition government, to bring about the great unity among the various classes and, in addition, to establish a unified leadership for the war effort. Without all this, the Liberated Areas could not have waged an all-out people's war; and without an all-out people's war, nothing at all could have been accomplished.

In the political field, the Liberated Areas have succeeded in mobilizing the people and forging national unity by bringing about democracy and raising the people's living standards. The hearts of millions beat as one in the fight against the common enemy; and so a genuine foundation for the conduct of a people's war has been laid. The Kuomintang areas bear witness that without genuine democracy and real improvement in the people's livelihood there can be no people's war. On the other hand, the Liberated Areas have proved that a people's war can be waged, given real democracy and improved living conditions for the people.

That is how, in the Liberated Areas, the people's enthusiasm in the War of Resistance and their confidence in their own nation have been brought to so high a pitch. That is why, despite the unparalleled

cruelty of the enemy's "burn all, kill all, loot all" policy, the fighting spirit of the people in the Liberated Areas has never faltered.

That is how the solidarity between the army and the people and between officers and men has reached such heights; why the campaigns to support the government and care for the people and to support the army and give special consideration to the anti-Japanese soldiers' families have spread far and wide; and why, despite attacks by Japanese and puppet troops from without and provocation from within by spies and agents of the Japanese and puppet authorities, this solidarity can never be shaken.

That is how we have achieved political unity, military unity and the integration of political and military affairs, thus thwarting the plans of the Japanese and their puppets to wage a "total war".

That is why, under extremely difficult conditions, we have been able to achieve "better troops and simpler administration"; how our combat units have been strengthened to cope with enemy encirclement and attack; and why, despite the changes in our base areas, all our organizations have been able to carry on the struggle together with the people, and also to direct such struggle.

That is why, by strengthening our political work, we can sap the Japanese army's morale and win over the puppet troops. Everyone knows that Japanese prisoners-of-war are pretty obstinate, but our work in this respect has gone well. We are particularly grateful to the Japanese People's Emancipation League led by Comrade Susumu Okano,¹⁷⁴ one of the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, and to the Korean Independence League.¹⁷⁵ They have worked in the noble spirit of internationalism and their help to us has been of inestimable value.

That is how, through effective underground work, we can win over all people with national awareness in the enemy-occupied areas and foil enemy attempts to persuade them to surrender and "turn over a new leaf".

Economics is the very foundation of political, military and cultural affairs. When we talk about improving the people's living conditions, we mean, in the first place, reducing rent and interest while ensuring that the reduced rates are paid. This is necessary in order to guarantee a sound economic foundation for conducting the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas, where the peasantry constitutes 80-90 per cent of the population.

That is how the peasants' interest in production has been stimu-

lated, how production has proceeded uninterrupted even during the enemy's repeated "mopping-up" campaigns.

That is how we have succeeded in mobilizing the peasants to organize mutual aid in labour (labour-exchange teams, groups, etc.), how general enthusiasm has been roused for increased production throughout the Liberated Areas. Productivity has been raised in this way to new heights. Not only agriculture (which is, in the present stage, the basic economic activity in every Liberated Area) but also cottage industries and handicraft workshops have been developed. So we are well on the way towards becoming self-sufficient, well-fed and well-clothed.

That, too, is why the publicly owned industries and the co-operative industrial and commercial enterprises are winning the genuine support of the people, and how a real foundation for their growth has been laid.

That is how co-operation in production between the army and people has been brought about — a co-operation that, coupled with the policy of "better troops and simpler administration" and of getting the army to take part in production and practising economy, is lightening the burden on the people, economizing manpower and available materials and reducing waste. All this eases the strain on the people and makes possible the accumulation of material resources for the long-term struggle.

That is how, in the economic sphere, the Liberated Areas have been able to pool their efforts, help each other when hit by natural calamities and thus save millions of lives. As a consequence, we have been able to do what we set out to do: carry on the struggle.

Military affairs are interrelated with political and economic affairs. The people's war is, in essence, a war of the masses, and only by means of the political and economic measures I have mentioned has the conduct of such a war been possible. As Comrade Mao Zedong says in his *On Protracted War*: "The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war." That is the starting point of the strategy and tactics employed during the past eight years by the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column, the basis for the entire system of strategy and tactics employed during the people's anti-Japanese war in the Liberated Areas. The

characteristic feature of this war of the masses is that the people help in military operations as well as give political and economic assistance. A war of this kind is not waged by the army alone but also by the people, who fight in skilful co-ordination with the army. The main forces fight in co-ordination with the local forces, and the regular army in co-ordination with the guerrilla forces, the militia and the people's self-defence corps.

Thus, in our pincer attacks on the enemy, we have adopted flexible fighting tactics on both exterior and interior lines.

In this way, we are able to counter the enemy's encirclement, his "mopping-up" campaigns, his "nibbling away" operations and his blockade measures.

In this way, we can steal the initiative from the enemy in strategic command and in directing a campaign, strive to extricate ourselves from a defensive position and force the enemy on to the defensive.

In this way, by making repeated thrusts we are able to repulse the enemy's "lightning tip-and-run raids", and, by scattering, concealing and moving our forces skilfully, seek out the enemy's weak points and break his encirclement.

In this way, we can annihilate scattered enemy forces by a concentration of our forces and, conversely, attack concentrated enemy forces by our scattered forces.

In this way, the enemy's blockade and dismemberment tactics can be disrupted by the destruction inflicted by our army and people; and the enemy's search and combing-out efforts can be smashed by land-mine warfare conducted by the militia together with scattered small armed units.

In this way, by co-ordinated attacks in several areas we can relieve neighbouring territory, smash the enemy's encircling, "mopping-up" campaigns, institute guerrilla warfare on the plains to aid guerrilla warfare in the mountains, and vice versa.

Thus the main force can move about freely and engage in or prepare for well-timed, successful counter-attacks, while the local forces carry on guerrilla warfare in the vicinity of their bases, engage the enemy in skirmishes and so harass and wear him out.

In this way, we have created armed work teams as a form of military resistance, using them as a keen weapon with which to begin or resume work in enemy-occupied areas. While the enemy extends his "mopping-up" campaign to our bases, our armed work teams are busy carrying out various forms of anti-Japanese activity in

the enemy areas themselves to keep the enemy in a state of mortal fear, and working out ways of combining unarmed with armed resistance.

During the eight years of the War of Resistance, what Comrade Mao Zedong in his *On Protracted War* calls “a war of a jig-saw pattern” has been employed to the full in the Liberated Areas.

The people’s army, the people’s war and the people’s strategy and tactics — these three things dovetail perfectly. They are the very flesh and sinews of the war in the Liberated Areas. They are, moreover, characteristic of the operations on every battle front there.

The various factors I have dealt with represent the sum total of experience gained in the people’s anti-Japanese war in the Liberated Areas — a war led by the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Zedong; and they all derive from the correct policy of the Party and Comrade Mao Zedong and from the people’s anti-Japanese war. Had we departed from Comrade Mao Zedong’s policy, had we divorced ourselves from the people, then, in the face of so powerful an enemy, none of these factors could ever have developed. And then, instead of crushing the enemy, we might long ago have been crushed by him.

III. THE MILITARY LINE ADOPTED BY THE CHINESE PEOPLE FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

TWO DIFFERENT MILITARY LINES

Comrade Mao Zedong in his report rightly points out that there are two different lines in the War of Resistance Against Japan. “One,” he says, “leads to the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, while the other not only makes their defeat impossible but in some respects actually helps them and undermines our War of Resistance.” These two lines are evident in the military as well as the political field.

One of them rises out of oppression of the people and the treatment of soldiers as slaves; out of a policy of carrying on a passive war of resistance or acting as mere onlookers; out of relying entirely on foreign aid; out of sparing one’s main force in preparation for civil war; out of excluding people who hold different opinions and out of disrupting unity. This is a defeatist and purely defensive military

line directed against the people — a line that explains why the Kuo-mintang has suffered successive reverses on its battle fronts.

The exact opposite of this is the anti-Japanese military line taken by the Chinese people, the corner-stone of which is to fully mobilize the people, unite all anti-Japanese forces and actively strike at the Japanese aggressors. This line creates unity between army and people, and between officers and men. It creates unity among all friendly armies and gives rise to the strategy and tactics of hitting the enemy hard and making ourselves strong. This explains why victories have been won in the Liberated Areas.

The first line stands for the preservation of the old system, old habits and old tactics of the Chinese army. It opposes any reforms required by new conditions in the war against Japan. That explains why a handful of people have for so long been able to usurp control of the army and use it as an instrument for running a ruthless dictatorship and oppressing the people. The second line stands for reforming the Chinese army in the light of military experience gained in the Northern Expedition (1926-27) and the Agrarian Revolutionary War (1927-37) and in accord with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle: "Unite the armed forces with the people and turn them into the armed forces of the people."¹⁷⁶ That is the only way in which the army can be united with the people, the only way in which the army's morale can be raised and the enemy defeated.

The first line assumes that the War of Resistance can be won in a short time, that it is a war of quick decision. No effort, therefore, is made to rally the people's strength for resistance. On the contrary, any such efforts by the people themselves are deliberately suppressed. The second line, on the other hand, realizes that the War of Resistance cannot be won in a short time, that it is necessarily a protracted war and, therefore, that ever-greater effort must be made to rally and enhance the people's strength.

Champions of the first line argue that the War of Resistance falls into only two stages: the stage before the fall of Wuhan, when the enemy was winning and we were losing, and the stage since then, in which we move from defeat to victory. They deny the intermediate stage of stalemate. Those who uphold the second line, however, maintain that the war falls into three stages: strategic retreat, strategic stalemate and strategic counter-offensive. Stalemate is the most trying stage, with so many things crying to be done. In the first place, we must introduce democracy and improve the livelihood of the people

before we can organize them as a force. We must create all the necessary conditions for a counter-offensive before we can even talk about launching it.

The supporters of the first line, again, have all along pinned their hopes for victory on the war between Japan and the Soviet Union and in the Pacific. They do not pin their hopes of victory on their own political or military reforms and on their own efforts in the War of Resistance Against Japan. Naturally they have been disappointed. The Pacific front was opened, yet all last year they suffered heavier defeats than ever. By contrast, the supporters of the second line have steadfastly relied on the people's strength. Although they try to obtain foreign help, they do not depend on it exclusively. The victories in the Liberated Areas over the past few years have been won through our own efforts. We have had no outside help at all.

Again, supporters of the first line advocate and practise a passive strategy of pure defence, while those of the second favour an active strategy of offensive defence as a preliminary to general counter-offensive.

Upholders of the first line do not punish generals who surrender to the enemy. On the contrary, they connive in their actions and imprison those who, like General Ye Ting¹⁰⁸ and others, have performed meritorious service. Advocates of the second line oppose all versions of capitulation, commend meritorious fighters, demand punishment for generals and other officers who mutiny or surrender to the enemy, praise political integrity and build the people's morale.

Advocates of the first line employ a faulty recruitment system. Able-bodied men are press-ganged, and bribery is resorted to flagrantly. The best sons of the Chinese people are treated as "expendable" and persecuted. Under the second line, a system of militia and self-defence corps, which is what the people want, and a volunteer system genuinely based on individual choice are the rule. This meets the army's needs and at the same time makes best use of China's manpower.

The first line is the military line of the Kuomintang. The second is that of the Communist Party.

The two are completely different. Which is right and which is wrong has long since been demonstrated by what has happened over the past eight years on the two battle fronts — one becoming weaker and weaker and the other stronger and stronger.

As is well known, Comrade Mao Zedong's famous military trea-

tises such as *On Protracted War* and *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan* represent the correct military line of the Communist Party.

Comrade Mao Zedong's military line is, in short, that of a people's army and a people's war. It is a line that will lead to victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan.

The military line of the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang is determined by its political line. Its military line follows its military theory; and Kuomintang military theory is saturated with German, Italian and Japanese fascist ideology. The outstanding feature of this ideology is that the army lords it over the people (through the special authority the army has over the people), and that the officers ride roughshod over soldiers (through the special authority the officers have over their men). With a powerful foe such as the Chinese nation has to face, this kind of military thinking amounts to disarmament and an invitation to defeat.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ARMY BUILDING

On the problems of army building, I fully agree with what Comrade Mao Zedong said in the sections of his report dealing with the people's war and the people's army. In those sections he raised certain questions and proposed solutions.

I want now to say a word or two about our aims in building an army. To do this, I would like to compare two different theories in China today on what an army should be formed for.

Think of the thousands upon thousands of troops, the thousands upon thousands of men with guns. Who are they? The people. The vast majority of them are peasants. But there are two kinds of armies, now as in the past. One kind organizes, arms and trains the people to protect their interests and serve them. The other also organizes, arms and trains the people; but it does so to protect the interests of the few — the big landlords, the big compradors and the big bankers — and to oppress, exploit and enslave the people.

There is no army that is not under the control of the state. There are, however, two kinds of state. One is the new-democratic state — a state that belongs to the people, to the workers, the peasants, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and other patriotic elements. The other is the feudal, fascist,

anti-popular state — a state that is under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie. The people's army is an army that belongs to the new-democratic state. The army of the big landlords, big compradors and big bankers belongs to a state under the dictatorship of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie.

The people's army, for the very reason that it is at one with the people, can defend the country effectively against the foreign foe and can safeguard the people's rights to democracy and freedom inside the country as well. The army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie, for the very reason that it is divorced from the people, is bound to be powerless to defend the country. It vacillates, becomes defeatist and may even betray the country (for instance, by becoming a puppet army). Domestically, it undermines and suppresses the people's rights to democracy and freedom.

The people's army practises democracy within its own ranks. Officers and men are as one. It is also democratic in relation to the people — people and army are as one. Because of this, it can sweep away the warlord system. The army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie imposes a system of oppression and double-dealing within its own ranks. Otherwise, it cannot order its officers and men, the vast majority of whom come from the people, to act against the people. This kind of army is, of course, bound to oppress people. Otherwise, it cannot be a tool of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie for oppressing, exploiting and enslaving the people. So this army not only preserves the warlord system, but extends it. Even in controlling its own members, it employs the most savage and shameless fascist methods. That is just what the reactionary ruling clique inside the Kuomintang is doing for all it is worth.

To which of these two kinds of armies do the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the South China Anti-Japanese Column belong?

They belong to the first category and Chinese history has never before seen their like. As Communists, we can be proud that it is we who have built this army of the people.

Like their predecessor, the Red Army of the civil war period, both our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, led by Comrade Mao Zedong, are national, popular and democratic in character. They are national because they have always opposed foreign invasion and displayed the utmost enthusiasm in defending their native land. They are popular because they come from the people and have always fought

hard for the liberation and well-being of the people. They are democratic because there is unity between army and people and between officers and men, because they have done away with the warlord system and made themselves an instrument of the struggle for people's democracy. It is because they have these three characteristics that they fight so well, indeed, that they are invincible. Thanks to the guidance of Comrade Mao Zedong's specific policy, these characteristics have become even more apparent during the War of Resistance and, as a consequence, our army has increased in strength and performed brilliant deeds in this costly war to defend our motherland.

The three characteristics of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are, in fact, our three principles of army building. In the final analysis, however, the most important one is: The army must start from the interests of the people and serve the people. Because such an army serves the people and belongs to the people, it takes it as a sacred duty to safeguard the motherland. That is why a high degree of democracy has developed in the army. A people's army of this kind is the army of a genuinely democratic country, an army that possesses a keen political awareness and the power to put up a real fight.

There is no doubt that the principles of army building adopted by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should be adopted by all armies in China. They furnish a model on which all of China's armies should be transformed. They open up brilliant prospects for the whole Chinese army, a road to blessings for our whole country. If the Chinese people want to achieve victory in the War of Resistance, if they want to achieve democracy and liberation, they must exert every effort to organize and expand armies on the model of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. If, on the other hand, some people try to weaken the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies or reorganize them on the pattern of an anti-popular army, it means they really want to destroy our Great Wall. It means they will inevitably undermine the War of Resistance, jeopardize the country and serve as cat's-paws for the Japanese invaders. The Chinese people will never let them do this.

We want to see armies all over the country follow a bright path, changing themselves into people's armies, not into private tools for oppressing the people. As Comrade Mao Zedong says in his report, "Every patriotic officer in the Kuomintang army who has a conscience should set about reviving the Sun Yat-sen spirit and transforming his troops."

These, then, are our main principles of army building. Now let me go on to some specific problems that arise in the building of an army.

RECRUITMENT

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two systems of recruitment. Officers and men of a people's army join of their own accord. The volunteer system now operated by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, as well as the system of obligatory military service that might be introduced by a coalition government of New Democracy, is based on the wishes of the people. The recruitment system of an army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie must necessarily go against the wishes of the people — no one would join without compulsion. The present so-called recruitment system of the Kuomintang works against the will of the people. This compulsory system has degenerated into a particularly vicious one. Its recruiting methods are "buying", press-ganging and trickery. In areas controlled by the Kuomintang, recruiting officers take bribes, break the law at will, and show no regard for human life. Recruits are callously treated. They are roped together and forced to endure cold, starvation, flogging and imprisonment. They are not even allowed to attend to calls of nature except at arbitrarily fixed times. As a result, great numbers of them either die or escape to become bandits. Only about one in five actually reaches barracks.

By contrast, the system adopted by our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is a voluntary one. Those who join our army come of their own free will because they want to resist Japanese aggression, save their country and build a China of New Democracy. Some of them are Communists but the vast majority are not. Because the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have this close contact with the people, they have an inexhaustible supply of manpower.

When in the future a coalition government and a joint supreme command are set up, a system of obligatory military service may be adopted. But any such system will be radically different from the present vicious conscription system of the Kuomintang government. Instead, it will be built on a voluntary basis, coupled with necessary persuasion.

MAINTAINING THE ARMY

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two ways of maintaining them. An army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them, maintains itself by exploiting the people and, as a consequence, by exploiting its soldiers as well. The methods employed by a people's army are based on love for the people and, consequently, on love for its soldiers, too. The latter are the methods of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

In addition to exploiting the people and the soldiers, the reactionary clique in the Kuomintang employs various schemes to extort military funds from the people on the pretext that "the state should maintain the troops". Not satisfied with extorting money at home, it also turns to foreign countries for loans in the name of the state. When the funds are collected, the reactionaries pocket the money by padding the payroll and other devices. Embezzlement among officers is rampant from top to bottom. The higher the officer's rank, the more money he can appropriate for himself. In consequence, even if ample military funds are available, the men remain haggard, thin and short of clothing. The Chinese warlords, most of whom very rich, usually roll in money — they get it from military funds. In reactionary Kuomintang circles, this ugly business goes even further. Nobody can make head or tail of military advanced-pay accounts. Nobody can even make a guess at the amount of "military allocations" the reactionaries have appropriated.

How do the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies maintain their troops?

Our soldiers are armed peasants in uniform. Our army consists of ordinary people under arms and in uniform. They want to be clothed and to eat, drink, rest and work the same as the common people. Their main material needs are clothing, food, housing and transport. Their spiritual need is education to resist Japanese aggression and to love the people. In maintaining the army, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies pay special attention to material needs and to needs of the spirit as well.

In the first place, the material upkeep of the army follows the principle that it shall not become too heavy a burden on the people; otherwise there will be a conflict of interests between the army and the people. If the people's life is made hard, army life will become hard as well and its capacity to fight the enemy will suffer. When a situation

develops that requires expansion of the army, the expansion must be accomplished without excessively increasing the burden on the people. When we encounter difficult times, as we did in 1942, our working principle is to consider the interests of both the army and the people: we apply the policy of “better troops and simpler administration” in the enemy’s rear. In the second place, our treatment of everyone in the army is based on the principle of equal treatment for officers and men. The officers set an example by taking the rough with the smooth in the same way as their men. Only those officers who have the interests of their men at heart, who take into account what their men have to put up with and do not stand apart from the rank and file can be considered good. That is the line we work on in maintaining our army. In this way the rotten practice of padding payrolls and exploiting soldiers in the army is rejected, and a new chapter is written in Chinese military history. In the third place, we have in recent years introduced a completely new principle into the army’s maintenance by enabling it to engage in productive work in the intervals between fighting and training, and thus help to meet the material needs of the army and lighten the burdens of the people. This innovation is extremely important for our army. Experience gained from the army’s participation in productive work in the border regions shows that, in the absence of fighting, we can in the first year become partly self-supporting; in the second, half self-supporting; and in the third, wholly so. In areas where fighting is going on, the army may, by taking part in production, become partly or half self-supporting. Personal participation by commanders in productive work is an important means of involving the army in it. When the army takes part in production, the people’s burden is lightened, ties between the army and the people become closer, army life becomes richer, the army becomes more consolidated, training is more effective, and fighting spirit is enhanced. An inexhaustible source of funds to maintain the army is also tapped.

We have taken a number of new measures in recent years to provide special consideration for the families of men fighting the Japanese and made new arrangements for disabled or demobilized soldiers. In addition to giving them pensions and getting neighbours to plough their land, we help them produce so that they can become economically independent. Indeed, many labour heroes have emerged from among them or their family members who are doing quite well now in their livelihood. Every Liberated Area should endeavour to do this work well and see that they live comfortably.

This method of maintaining the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies represents a reform unparalleled in Chinese military history. It is a reform characteristic of the internal life of the army and also of its external life, that is, its relations with the people. That is why these armies can maintain their soldiers and maintain them well without outside assistance.

LEADING THE ARMY

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two methods of leading them. The method used by an army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them is to treat soldiers as slaves, whereas the people's army's method is to treat them as politically aware fighters. The latter is the method of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

The big landlords and big bourgeoisie organize and arm the people to create an army which will be used against the people. That is of course no easy matter; and that is why an army of this kind resorts to all sorts of barbarities in leading its troops. The policy of the reactionaries is to keep soldiers in a state of ignorance, applying the maxim that "the most valuable quality in generals is wisdom, in soldiers ignorance". If soldiers were wise they would not act against the people. So the reactionaries devise a set of military codes and military orders and discipline, on the basis of which they impose a ruthless system of absolute dictatorship and absolute obedience. Those who fail to toe the line are punished. Those who do toe it get promotion and grow rich. On the one hand the reactionaries use threats, on the other they dangle bait. A whole system is built up of ill-treating soldiers, using secret agents to spy on them and even surreptitiously murdering them. What this means is that they have no regard for the human dignity of their subordinates and soldiers and they bully and cow them, through a rotten system of absolute obedience, into allowing dictators to use the army in any way they think fit. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie want to oppress, exploit and enslave the people. By what method except savagery can they command their army?

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have completely wiped out the system of oppression that prevailed in the army for thousands of years. At the very birth of our people's army in 1927, we abolished

the system of brutality against soldiers. We regard officers and men alike as human beings on an equal footing. The only difference between them is in matters of duty. No officers are allowed to oppress the men, no senior officers to oppress their juniors. Our soldiers join the army to serve the people, not the officers. We call for extremely strict discipline, both in military affairs and in relations with the people. This kind of discipline is based on political understanding and is observed by officers and men alike without exception.

In recent years, we have developed a new way of leading soldiers. We started a campaign to educate soldiers to respect their officers and officers to care for their men. This movement has enormously strengthened unity within the army, greatly raised the morale of officers and men, and enabled the army to make rapid progress in all aspects of its work.

TRAINING THE ARMY

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two methods of training them. The method employed to train an army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them puts ignorance and coercion first. By contrast, the method used in training a people's army is based on political understanding and voluntary acceptance. The second method is that used by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

There are three aspects to the training of an army: training the mind, physical training, and training in military technique.

The first thing in training an army is to train the mind of the soldier. There will be no spirit of initiative in an army whose political understanding is low, which does not know what it is fighting for. In that case, no amount of training will get anywhere. Courage without political understanding is just brute courage. Conscious courage resulting from political awareness is true courage. To increase political understanding and military knowledge, soldiers must receive a basic level of education.

Since the army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie has a policy of keeping its soldiers ignorant, the soldiers are not interested in physical and technical training and it proves ineffective. It is useless to equip such soldiers with modern weapons; they may simply hand them over to the enemy.

The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have achieved remarkable results in the cultivation of the mind. The political understanding of our army is high, which is why it is unconquerable. As a result of our fight in recent years against tendencies to be dogmatic or formalistic, political training has become more thorough and practical. Both officers and men have systematically improved their military knowledge and a considerable advance has been made in the study and application of strategy and tactics. With regard to general education, while we obtained some results at the very beginning, we have done much better in recent years. As far as cultivation of the mind goes, for the past year or so we have trained our troops for various productive jobs as well as provided political and general education. Training for production not only helps our production campaign, but fosters as well a sound attitude towards labour and prevents our men from becoming loafers or scoundrels in uniform. They will still be useful members of society when the war is over.

It should also be pointed out that we owe a great deal of our success in cultivating the minds of our soldiers to the many intellectuals and educated young men who have joined our army since the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan. I want to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation.

Now a word on physical training. Fighting involves hand-to-hand combat, a matching of strength. Physical training, therefore, is important. Building physical strength demands, first of all, a full stomach and warm clothing. Only then can we set about various forms of physical exercise. As the army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie operates by exploiting the rank and file, naturally its soldiers cannot acquire a good physique. In the people's army, with its emphasis on consideration and care for the men, it is quite the reverse.

Next comes training in technique and tactics. In the past there was a tendency in our army to scoff at the idea of physical strength and technique. It was regarded as enough for the army to have political awareness. This is quite wrong. Did we win battles in the past? Yes, we did. But that does not mean that our technical skill was either adequate or good enough. If we had had greater physical strength and better technique, as well as political awareness, we might have won greater battles and suffered fewer casualties. But it is only fair to say that this wrong tendency has now been corrected. During the last couple of winters we carried out training on a large scale.

In some areas this developed into military training for all the people. Our regular troops have improved enormously, and large numbers of the militiamen have now learned how to lay mines. To have accomplished so much is very significant.

In recent years we have worked out a new method of training troops by replacing the “officer line” — which gave officers and instructors sole control over training — with the “mass line”, the basis of which is co-operation between officers and men. In our army we have introduced a new educational method. It is to make teaching and learning complement each other. The officers teach the men and the men teach the officers. The officers teach one another as do the men. Those who are intellectuals and those who are of worker or peasant origin also help and learn from each other. Such an arrangement is just what is needed in the present war conditions. We place a high value on the lectures on special technical skills given by our officers or instructors. Since the outbreak of the War of Resistance, many military specialists have joined our army and played a fine part in raising our fighting capacity. We give them a warm welcome. At the same time officers must not overlook the fact that every one of the hundreds or thousands of men under their command has his individual strengths, that in our army there are highly skilled men from every trade. Officers should not be too proud to learn from them. We have changed the attitude of officers from one of conceit and superiority to one of untiringly learning from others and teaching others. Scarcely had this system of relying on the masses in training troops been adopted when we discovered not a few whose abilities had remained unknown among the hundreds of thousands of men in the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. In the course of troop training, new heroes and new skills have been discovered every day and our technique has been vastly enriched. This wave of study is the very basis on which our men can master new skills. In short, the classrooms and drill grounds that the men used to fear have been turned into places where military skill and knowledge are cultivated and tempered. The whole atmosphere is different, interest has been heightened and the barracks have been turned into schools.

We have certainly done a great deal in training troops. But can we be satisfied with this? No, we cannot. To prepare for the future counter-offensive, we must from now on learn to master new techniques; and the most important thing we have to learn is artillery warfare.

We have to improve our tactics by painstakingly reviewing the experience gained in battle and in field manoeuvres. The contents of the Four Main Courses¹⁷⁷ should be used only as reference material for tactical and technical education. We should take from them whatever is of practical value, but not study them mechanically. Our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies cannot yet master completely every aspect of military science and technique. We still have a long way to go in this respect. It is most important that the entire army continue studying in order to master whatever new military techniques we need.

This principle of troop training ensures that the rank and file of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies will be courageous and resourceful fighters on the anti-Japanese battle front, and that tomorrow, after victory, they will form the hard core of a modernized national defence force, as well as being capable of leading in the work of production and education in the period of national economic construction. In this way, the demobilization of our army will not create any difficulty for the people or the government.

CONDUCTING THE WAR

Just as there are two kinds of armies, so there are two different methods of carrying on a war. An army which is antagonistic to the people rather than belonging to them is necessarily limited to fighting by cut-and-dried rules and formulas. But a people's army uses methods of great flexibility and constantly adapts itself to the actual situation; and this is true of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

Because the army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie oppresses the people and receives no help from them, because there is no community of interest between officers and men, such an army cannot, when engaged in war, rely on the initiative and enthusiasm of its junior officers and men. It is, in fact, compelled to expend great effort to prevent large-scale desertions. It is very difficult to wage war with such an army. The higher command issues orders based entirely on preconceived, cut-and-dried rules, without weighing the enemy's strength against one's own and disregarding special conditions of time and place. Consequently such orders are utterly impractical. When a unit receives orders that cannot be carried out,

it makes false reports to the higher command. Both superiors and subordinates try to pull the wool over each other's eyes. Can such an army win victories? Many incredible phenomena have occurred in the War of Resistance. Mutinous generals have never been brought to justice. Generals who surrendered to the enemy have been given important positions after their return. And some generals who defended cities in conditions of enormous difficulty have been shot! This is an odd system of rewards and punishments, isn't it?

With the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army things are entirely different. When we are fighting we are helped everywhere by the people. Since the militia was organized and tunnel-digging and mine-laying began, the scale and importance of the help the people have given us are incalculable. Within the army itself, because it has a high degree of political awareness and because there is mutual understanding and a feeling of solidarity between officers and men, everyone knows where he stands and can act on his own initiative. Having a single aim, the fighters are mobile and swift; they can fight bravely. As an ancient saying goes, for a general not to know how to use his soldiers is tantamount to delivering the nation to the enemy; and for the soldiers not to know the worth of their generals is tantamount to delivering them to the enemy. That is something that never happens in our army.

Our policy in conducting the war may be summed up like this: How we are to fight depends on the weapons we possess, the kind of enemy before us, and the specific time and place. This means that a battle has to be planned and fought on the basis of our own equipment, the strength of the enemy, and the factors of time, terrain, and so on. This new method of conducting war is both practical and materialist. It is of profound significance. Many a military expert, in China and abroad, both in the present and in the past, has failed disastrously in this respect. Some of our comrades who held "Left" ideas in the past failed to understand just this point. Earlier on, when the only weapons at our disposal were rifles, spears and broad swords, we simply had to study the specific conditions and make our decisions and determine our tactics accordingly. We didn't talk in high-flown terms about the tactics of a mechanized army. When we passed from the period of civil war to that of the anti-Japanese war, when the enemy we had to face was the Japanese army, we were not content to cling to experiences from the civil war period. We made necessary changes and improvements. We made the relevant

decisions and determined our tactics after a thorough study of the enemy's situation. And of course, in the Liberated Areas we have to devise tactics applicable to the particular time and place of this type of battle front. These general rules for the conduct of war contain a special feature — unity between the army and the people. On the one hand, the fight waged by the army serves to help the various struggles in which the people are engaged; and on the other, the people's efforts — political, economic, cultural and military, as well as the disruption of the enemy's communication lines — serve to help the army wage war. This co-operation between the army and the people in all spheres is practised thoroughly on our fronts, in every campaign and in every battle. This is the new method of conducting war that we have worked out in the course of the people's war. It is the method of Comrade Mao Zedong.

Officers, their men and the people all have one common objective: to attack the enemy in every way possible. Consequently, as long as orders issued by the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies suit local conditions and are practical, they are carried out. Even if orders are occasionally impractical or arrive too late, no harm is done, because lower units are able to adapt themselves to circumstances, make judgements and act independently. That is why we are winning all along the line.

Last year the Kuomintang troops suffered a miserable defeat in Henan Province. Those who have studied the campaign have come to the conclusion that the defeat was due to five discordant factors: the various armies were at odds with each other; the officers were at odds with the men; the army was at odds with the government, as well as with the Kuomintang party, and with the people. This is all that can be expected. An army of the big landlords and big bourgeoisie runs into conflict at every turn, while the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies meet with agreement and harmony everywhere. That is the fundamental difference.

Now a word on military theory. Whenever this subject is raised, some people like to show off with a series of high-sounding military academy lectures, or by quoting at length from the military history of one country or another. What they say is all very profound, but unfortunately these theories are not necessarily of practical value to the Chinese people. Undoubtedly we must draw on the military theories and experience of all countries. We ought to learn from them. It will be bad for us if we do not. What we must not do,

however, is to apply such theories and experience mechanically; we must not accept them as immutable dogma. The Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolutionary War and the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan have given birth to a correct military science that best suits the needs of the Chinese people. It is a military science that combines theory with practice. Comrade Mao Zedong's many military writings are good expositions of this new military science. From the various battles fought in the revolutionary civil wars and from battles now being fought on the fronts of the Kuomintang and the Liberated Areas, we can see the soundness of the ideas set forth in these works. Experience gained in the War of Resistance is a yardstick against which the soundness of Comrade Mao Zedong's military theories can be tested. Everything I mentioned when dealing with the military experience in the War of Resistance in the Liberated Areas, as well as the whole strategy of people's war, comes from the successful application of Comrade Mao Zedong's methods.

In our persistent struggle behind the enemy lines we achieve victories by adopting the basic principles of strategy and tactics laid down by Comrade Mao Zedong. These basic principles are: oppose adventurism when on the offensive, oppose conservatism when on the defensive, and oppose flightism when moving from one place to another. These basic principles are based on the close fighting unity between the army and the people. It is this unity that makes their application possible.

POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMY

The two kinds of armies conduct two kinds of political work.

The aim of political work conducted by the reactionary clique within the Kuomintang is to trick the officers and men. Otherwise the big landlords and big bourgeoisie would not be able to do as they please. Therefore, instead of anti-Japanese education, the reactionaries in the Kuomintang carry out anti-Communist education in the army. Instead of teaching officers and men to work for democracy, they demand their blind obedience. They set up a system of secret informers in the army. Officers and men with democratic ideas are labelled dangerous and kept under scrutiny, dismissed, arrested, or even secretly done away with. This sinister, merciless secret surveillance regime is aimed to blunt the political consciousness of the

soldiers, to encourage their ignorance, to spy on — and even murder — officers and men who hold democratic views, to isolate the army from the people and to use the army to oppress the people. If the men in an army are brutalized, that army will never serve the people, but inevitably will brutalize the people. In such an army spying on your own men is called “political” work; but it is poles apart from the political work in our army.

The aim of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is to serve the people and safeguard the country, and therefore political work is; the life-blood of these armies. Our political work sets out: (1) to raise the political understanding of officers and men, to inspire them with love for their country and their people, and to fire them with a desire to re-educate themselves; (2) to bring about unity between our army and friendly army units; (3) to cement the unity between the army and the people, to make the people more politically aware of the necessity of safeguarding the country and democracy, and to help spread education and culture among the people; (4) to demoralize the Japanese and puppet troops by political and psychological means and sap their fighting strength; and (5) to consolidate and increase the fighting strength of our army, to guarantee that orders are carried out, and to help the army itself to make an intensive study of politics and military matters, to receive a general education and to master production skills. These five aspects of our political work are interrelated and complement each other. They characterize all our political work. Ours is a people’s army with unity between army and people, between officers and men. The war we wage is a people’s war. We apply the strategy and tactics of a people’s war; and we have won battles. All these are inseparably linked to our political work.

THE ARMY COMMAND

The two kinds of armies use two methods of command and two types of command organizations.

Because the reactionaries in the Kuomintang want to eliminate those who differ with them, they nominate their own divisional commanders. More often than not, these commanders take orders only from the supreme commander of the Kuomintang army, and pay no attention to anyone else. As a result, many army commands above

divisional level serve no purpose at all. In the course of a battle, myriads of orders are issued, often at variance with or flatly contradicting one another. The staff organizations, even the general staff at the headquarters of the supreme command, frequently become mere channels for transmitting orders.

By contrast, all levels of the commanding bodies of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies monitor and restrain each other. They have responsibility as well as authority. Harmony prevails in their ranks. There is unity in command, yet sufficient latitude for lower units to display initiative. Thus the army is united from top to bottom.

One of the special merits of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is the ability of various units to co-operate with one another and to co-ordinate their actions. The lower units never try to shift responsibilities to some one else when they receive orders from higher authorities, and when no orders are forthcoming they voluntarily co-operate one with another. Excellent co-operation is also maintained between main forces and local, guerrilla, militia and self-defence forces. As a result, there is unity among all our forces.

The staff organizations of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are capable of truly effective work. That is the fundamental difference between them and the staff organizations of the Kuomintang army. During recent years, our staff work has improved due to the efforts of the staff personnel. It must be improved still further *to* prepare for the forthcoming counter-offensive. In modern warfare, large formations cannot be commanded by a single individual: they require a joint command. And effective joint command is impossible without effective staff work. Therefore, our army staffs must continue to improve their work. They must do this above all in reconnaissance and communications, in order to collect accurate and up-to-the-minute intelligence.

EQUIPMENT AND OTHER PROBLEMS

For several years the most difficult problem facing us in the Liberated Areas has been obtaining equipment and military supplies. We are solving this in several ways. First, we arm ourselves with weapons seized from the enemy. For several years now we have relied on this method of strengthening our forces and maintaining our

fighting power. Second, we make use of locally obtainable materials. The abundance of coal, iron and metal obtained from dismantled railway tracks in north China has greatly facilitated our manufacture of arms; this is how the greater part of the militia forces have been able to engage in mine-laying on an increasing scale. Third, we have set up small-scale ordnance factories by assembling odds and ends of equipment captured from the Japanese and puppet troops. Fourth, we disperse and camouflage these factories, which often become the target of enemy "mopping-up" campaigns. Greater armed protection must be provided for them so that ammunition can be produced without interruption to supply the front. As far as medical supplies go, we use both traditional Chinese and Western medicines. We manufacture only a small part of the medicines we use; the main sources of supply are purchase and seizure from the enemy. We are most grateful to overseas Chinese and friends who helped us with medical supplies at the beginning of the War of Resistance. These sources have dried up since 1939, when the Kuomintang authorities began a blockade of the Liberated Areas. But difficulties cannot daunt us. We can overcome them, thanks to the efforts of our military supply personnel.

STRONG MAIN FORCES AND STRONG RESERVES

The armed forces in the Liberated Areas fall into three categories: main forces, local forces, and militia and self-defence forces. The main job of the militia and self-defence forces is to protect their own villages while carrying on regular production. By protecting homes and defending themselves, no matter where they may be, they are fighting the war against Japan together with other districts and with the entire Liberated Areas. Local and national tasks in this war go hand in hand. In the entire history of our army, militia forces have never existed on such a scale as in the Liberated Areas. The very fact that we have learned to organize such a militia speaks volumes. Once the militia is organized, it can fight either alone or in co-ordination with the regular army. It has done a fine job of protecting the people in the Liberated Areas so that they can produce more. The recovery of many positions behind the enemy lines owes a great deal to the success of the militia in besieging the enemy troops. The militia's chief weapon is land-mines. They also have rifles and

hand grenades as well as a variety of primitive weapons, including improvised grenade-throwers. To secure arms through their own efforts, in many places the militia reclaim land to contribute revenue for the manufacture of ammunition.¹⁷⁸ The militia in many localities is organized in such a way that it can fight in co-ordination with the militia of other areas. In these cases, we see the militia starting to evolve into regular local forces. The militia and self-defence forces also take an active part in production. Their members are both fighters and producers, both a military and a labour force. That is something that radically changes the face of the countryside. Local forces occupy a place midway between the main forces and the militia. They are responsible for the defence of one or several counties. They are responsible not only for the important military task of launching counter-“mopping-up” campaigns, but for looking after the immediate concerns of the people. For example, they protect local people during the harvest and planting seasons. They also fight floods, drought and other natural hazards. The men who form these local forces naturally love the locality where they were born and brought up and where their forefathers are buried. That makes it possible for us to strengthen these forces so that they serve as local garrisons in the War of Resistance. As each local force becomes experienced and strengthened in carrying out this task, it becomes more similar to, more on the level of, a main force. Sometimes main forces are concentrated. At other times they are dispersed. So it is necessary for them to joint with local and militia forces to increase their own strength and strike at the enemy with greater impact. Working with one another, the main, local and militia forces become an organic whole. In a crisis, we can advantageously disperse the main forces and integrate them with the local forces, with the masses. When, on the other hand, the situation favours the expansion of our work, the militia and local forces can, in certain conditions, come together to co-operate with the main forces, or actually become part of the main forces themselves, in order to fulfil the more important tasks called for by expansion. By such measures, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies have created a militia of more than two million men to provide support and reserves. That is one of the reasons they can sustain protracted warfare. This is an enormous step forward in our army building in the Liberated Areas.

In his political report Chairman Mao Zedong said: “When a unit of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or any other armed

force of the people arrives at a place, it should immediately help the local people to organize forces led by the local cadres, including not only militia and self-defence corps but also local troops and regional forces. This will make possible the eventual creation of regular forces and regular army formations led by local people. This is an extremely important task. Unless it is accomplished, we can neither build stable anti-Japanese base areas nor expand the people's army." This, then, is our task.

BREAKING UP THE PUPPET TROOPS

In recent years our army has done a good deal to demoralize the puppet troops.

These puppet troops are Chinese. In helping the Japanese invaders to oppress and slaughter their fellow-countrymen, they have committed the worst of crimes. Unless they change their stand quickly, cross over to our side and render good service to atone for their crime, they will be liable to such severe punishment as the nation demands, and will be wiped out together with the Japanese invaders.

The composition of the puppet troops is very mixed. Among the 800,000 we face, half a million are former Kuomintang troops who surrendered to the enemy as a result of the Kuomintang reactionaries' ridiculous order to "save the nation by a devious path".

We cannot, therefore, apply one hard and fast rule to all puppet troops. There is only one thing to be done with the diehards who have worked hand in glove with the enemy and repeatedly turned a deaf ear to our advice — unhesitatingly destroy them. As for those puppet officers and men who do have national awareness but were temporarily fooled by the Kuomintang reactionaries and so surrendered to the enemy — we should win them over by propaganda, rescue them from crime and return them to the embrace of our motherland.

We must, however, give them a word of warning. Hitler has been vanquished, and it will not be long before the Japanese invaders meet the same fate. These puppets have committed many crimes. Unless they cross over to our side soon, they will not have time to serve their country and redeem themselves; and they will be punished as the nation demands. Any delay in coming over to our side will be at their own peril.

IV. OUR FUTURE MILITARY TASKS

Comrades! I have dealt with our military line in a fairly systematic way and explained how we should carry on our work in various fields. Now I want to say something about our future military tasks.

MILITARY TASKS THROUGHOUT THE NATION

In his political report Chairman Mao Zedong said: “. . . The urgent need is to unite representatives of all political parties and groups and of people without any party affiliation and establish a provisional democratic coalition government for the purpose of instituting democratic reforms, surmounting the present crisis, mobilizing and unifying all the anti-Japanese forces in the country to fight in effective co-ordination with the Allied countries for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, and thus enabling the Chinese people to liberate themselves from the latter's clutches. After that it will be necessary to convene a national assembly on a broad democratic basis and set up a formally constituted democratic government, which will also be in the nature of a coalition and will have a still wider representation of people from all parties and groups or without any party affiliation, and which will lead the liberated people of the whole country in building an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful new China. In short, we must take the line of unity and democracy, defeat the aggressors and build a new China.”

This proposal of Comrade Mao Zedong is the political guide to victory in China's War of Resistance, and to building the nation.

In carrying out this political line, our military task is to unite the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies with all friendly forces engaged in the War of Resistance in order to defeat the Japanese aggressors. To this end, the army and the people of the entire country urgently demand that the supreme command, now under the one-party dictatorship of the Kuomintang, be reorganized, and that it be replaced by a joint supreme command which, based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principle of democracy, is capable of exercising effective and unified command.

This joint supreme command should work in conformity with Dr. Sun's principle of identifying the armed forces so closely with the people that they become the armed forces of the people. Accordingly,

all corrupt practices existing in the Kuomintang command and army that divorce the army from the people and are contrary to the interests of the people must be eliminated or drastically changed. Military lines and policies not in the interests of the War of Resistance and of the people must be changed. High-ranking defeatist and pro-Japanese elements must be dismissed and military training improved. Democratic methods of work and political consciousness must be fostered in the army and secret surveillance within the army abolished for good. The conscription system, which harms both the people and the execution of the War of Resistance, must be radically changed. Discipline in accordance with national honour and interest must be enforced, and the treatment of officers and men must be improved. Only by taking these measures can relations be improved between the Kuomintang army and the people, as well as between officers and men in the Kuomintang army. Only in this way can real unity between the army and the people be achieved, and the armed forces improve their fighting capacity for the benefit of the War of Resistance. The establishment of such a joint supreme command as described above is therefore in the interests of the patriotic officers and men of the Kuomintang army.

Creation of such a joint supreme command is also in the interests of those officers and men in every provincial force who love their country, because it would do away with all unequal treatment that has divided the nation's armed forces, because it would put an end to the defeatist strategy of preserving one's own strength at the expense of others, because it would help the provincial forces make progress and do what the people expect of them, and because it would unite all armies throughout the country and radically change the war situation.

A joint supreme command of this sort is also needed in the Liberated Areas — which for eight years have borne the brunt of the fighting — and by all the armies engaged in bitter fighting behind enemy lines (the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the friendly forces) so that operations in both the Kuomintang areas and the Liberated Areas can be effectively co-ordinated and all forces in the Liberated Areas given far more vigorous assistance to defeat the Japanese aggressors.

It is specially necessary to emphasize that this joint supreme command must supply the modern weapons available to all forces, without exception, capable of fighting the enemy in order to wipe out the

enemy, speed up victory and liberate the nation. Such a joint supreme command should not withhold such weapons for the purpose of fighting a civil war and oppressing the people.

Members of the Communist Party themselves both inside and outside the army must collaborate with all democratic elements and all military units in China. In the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, Communist Party members are in the minority, because officers and men are not compelled to join the Communist Party (in the Kuomintang army they are compelled to join the Kuomintang). In actual fact, therefore, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are allied armies of Communists and other democratic elements; they are armies of the people.

All officers and men of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are willing to make common cause with all other anti-Japanese armies throughout the country, to work for the establishment of a joint supreme command and to defeat the Japanese aggressors. All past prejudices should be abandoned and all friction ended. It is our opinion that officers and men of all anti-Japanese forces have been fighting heroically in the War of Resistance and have rendered meritorious service to the country and the people. In reorganizing the Kuomintang command to create a basis for unity among all armies in the country, it is, above all, necessary to reinforce their united strength so that, in collaboration with our Allies, we can bring about the speedy defeat of the Japanese. This is not only what is expected by the army, the people throughout the country and democratic public opinion among the Allies. It is also what is expected by most of the patriotic officers and democratic elements within the Kuomintang.

OUR MILITARY TASKS IN AREAS UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

Our military tasks in the areas occupied by the Japanese are: to intensify political work to win over the people; to intensify organizational work among them; to strengthen our political influence over Japanese and puppet troops and the police in order to get them to revolt against the Japanese and cross over to our side; to carry out more intensive work in cities in the rear of the enemy; and to organize our underground forces. If all these tasks are carried out in co-ordination with our army's actions, then the army can assuredly take the lead

in expelling the Japanese aggressors from the mainland of China when the great day arrives for the general counter-offensive.

Comrade Mao Zedong has often said: We ought to learn from the experience gained by the French underground forces in liberating France. All Chinese in the Japanese-occupied areas who love their country and all our comrades working in these areas should always bear Comrade Mao Zedong's advice in mind. They should be conscious of their great responsibilities and take practical measures to prepare themselves, so that when the time is ripe they can smash the Japanese bandits and recover their beloved land.

OUR MILITARY TASKS IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

As the spearhead of the general counter-offensive on the Chinese mainland, the army in the Liberated Areas has to shoulder the extremely important strategic task of defeating the Japanese aggressors by co-operating with all friendly forces throughout the country and the forces of our Allies.

Our military tasks in the Liberated Areas may be set out as follows:

1) We must expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the areas occupied by the Japanese. In conformity with the principle that "the rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen", we should strive to recover every inch of enemy-occupied territory. Comrade Mao Zedong told us: "In the prevailing circumstances, the troops of the Liberated Areas should launch extensive attacks on all places that can be captured from the Japanese and puppets in order to expand the Liberated Areas and reduce the occupied areas." "But at the same time it should be borne in mind that the enemy is still strong and may launch further attacks on the Liberated Areas. The army and the people of our areas must be ready at all times to smash his attacks and must work in every way to consolidate these areas."¹⁷⁹

Last year our army recovered 16 county towns behind the enemy lines. In four months this year another 12 have been recovered. This has been possible because the Japanese invaders have had far too much on their hands, while we have been growing stronger and stronger through hardening in battle. In these circumstances, it would be advantageous for us, in compliance with Comrade Mao Zedong's instructions, to mass still stronger forces for an offensive against any areas that can be recovered. This would reduce the number of enemy

attacks and gradually pave the way for the change from guerrilla to mobile warfare. At the same time we must take into account the fact that for a certain period the enemy is still able to mount attacks against the Liberated Areas and we should make proper preparations to counter them. We should continue to avoid offensive adventurism and any concentration of forces for actions not warranted by circumstances.

2) We must expand the people's forces so as to break up and wipe out Japanese and puppet troops. If victory in the War of Resistance is to be won and the danger of civil war prevented, there must be an expansion of our main forces as well as our local, guerrilla and militia forces. But this expansion must be attained in such a way that it does not throw too heavy a burden on the people. As Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out, "The new China or the old China — these are the two prospects facing the Chinese people, the Communist Party of China. . . ." ¹⁸⁰ And he said that these two prospects will still confront us, even when Japanese imperialism is defeated. To bring the new China into being, to give the Chinese people the promise of a brilliant future, we must have strong people's forces. I have already explained how we must go about breaking up and wiping out the Japanese and puppet forces. Our job now is to work more effectively — and more quickly — in this respect.

3) We have to intensify the training of our existing forces — the regular troops, local forces and the militia and self-defence forces — in preparation for the counter-offensive. To prepare our main forces for mobile warfare, we must ensure that they are steadily toughened and provided the experience of properly-planned concentrated attacks on the enemy. We must also see that the militia get their training. They should manufacture large numbers of various types of mines, and learn various methods of detonation so that they can use them in the greatest number of ways.

4) We must improve technical skills. Strategic counter-offensive calls for modern equipment. From now on we must improve our technical skills so that we can handle such equipment when the opportunity arises. We have already captured some pieces of artillery. We must learn about gunnery and the tactics of modern warfare.

5) We must strengthen our command system. We must improve our staff work to make it equal to the task of commanding our troops under present conditions and at the same time get it ready for an

expansion of the war. We must make better preparations for a great counter-offensive. We must strengthen our political work, encourage our soldiers and enhance their morale and intensify military studies to ensure that we can successfully deal with the present situation behind the enemy lines. We must, moreover, make certain that should the situation undergo any radical change we would be able to take on any new battles. In our political task we have a new duty: to make proper arrangements to deal with the present situation and to work out far-sighted plans for the changes the future will bring. The work of the rear service must be strengthened in regard to supplies, health care, ordnance, and so forth. It should meet both current war needs and prepare to meet the needs of the future counter-offensive. Then we shall not be caught napping when the time of great need comes. We shall in the future need highly qualified personnel in vast numbers for our commands, and we should not hesitate to send large numbers of our best cadres into the army.

6) We must prepare a material base from which to launch the general counter-offensive. The whole army should be mobilized for productive work and mobilized to practise economy and lay in stocks of food and materials. In collecting the materials required for our counter-offensive we have to rely on our own efforts. And when the time comes for concentrated operations, we should be fully prepared for every exigency.

7) We must take better care of the families of anti-Japanese fighters. We must improve pension services for the wounded and the families of those killed in action; and we must make better arrangements for the disabled and demobilized soldiers.

8) In order to promote all this work and fulfil all these tasks, there must be complete unity within the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armed forces of the people. And, with this accomplished, we must work towards unity with the many friendly armies. Unity and progress are inseparable. Comrades must guard against conceit and pride, which contribute to a "mountain-stronghold" mentality. No matter how great the service rendered, credit should go not to any individual, but to the people. Not only should we avoid such faults. We should criticize ourselves every so often and learn from one another, so that we raise our abilities and do not fall short of the people's confidence and trust. If we practise self-criticism and refuse to allow ourselves to become conceited or arrogant, "moun-

tain-stronghold” mentality will decline, a stronger unity will be created both inside and outside our army, and we shall be invincible.

All these military tasks that will confront the Liberated Areas from now on, in other words, the central strategic task for which we must be prepared, correspond, generally speaking, to what Comrade Mao Zedong said in the early period of the War of Resistance: that the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies had to be prepared for a strategic change from guerrilla warfare to regular warfare in the later period of the war. It is now time for us to be prepared to make this change, step by step, in our practical work. All personnel in the army should be prepared to make fundamental changes in their outlook and in their practical work, so they will be ready for the general counter-offensive against the Japanese aggressors.

I have said before, and here I must stress again, that it would be a serious mistake to underrate the great importance of the Liberated Areas and of the struggle of their 90 million heroic, militant people for the cause of China’s liberation and the general counter-offensive against the Japanese aggressors.

V. CONCLUSION

Soon victory will dawn over China and over the whole world, in all its glory. The great undertaking for which the Chinese people have striven these past eight years is approaching its moment of decisive triumph. The political report made by Comrade Mao Zedong shows the political direction the Chinese people are taking. My report summarizes their military experience — mainly that gained in the Liberated Areas — during the eight years of the War of Resistance. Its purpose is to discover a way of fulfilling militarily Comrade Mao Zedong’s directives, of performing the great tasks he has set before the Chinese people in waging the War of Resistance and building the nation.

Comrades! The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the other armies of the people were created by the blood and sacrifice of countless numbers of our comrades and of the Chinese people. Every comrade, every fighter who made the supreme sacrifice will be forever remembered. Here I should like to recall what Comrade Mao Zedong said in his report about the people’s army:

“This army is powerful because all its members have a discipline based on political consciousness; they have come together and they fight not for the private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and of the whole nation. The sole purpose of this army is to stand firmly with the Chinese people and to serve them wholeheartedly.

“Guided by this purpose, this army has an indomitable spirit and is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield. No matter what the difficulties and hardships, so long as a single man remains, he will fight on.”

The conclusion that Comrade Mao Zedong has drawn is forthright and bold — and it is correct. It reflects the deep-rooted strength of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the other armies of the people. These armies embody the strength of the Chinese people, the quintessence of the strength of the Chinese people — and they have a boundless future. Their strength will continue to exist as long as the great Chinese nation exists. These armies will continue to strive, together with the Chinese people, to defeat the Japanese invaders, to surmount all obstacles that prevent China from becoming an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful nation. The present congress of our Party, under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong, will lead us forward along the road to victory.

Comrades! For 24 years our great Communist Party of China, side by side with the entire Chinese people, has been engaged in a struggle for national liberation and social progress. In the course of this struggle we have worked out not only a powerful political line that can lead to the solution of China's political problems, but also a most powerful military line that can solve the problems of China's revolutionary war. The representative exponent of our political line and our military line is our leader, Comrade Mao Zedong. For the victory of the War of Resistance, I, here at this congress, would like to make a point of urging our comrades to study Comrade Mao Zedong's military writings just as seriously as they do his writings on politics, economics and culture. All units of the army, all military schools and all military training classes must make Comrade Mao Zedong's military writings their basic text, the living core of their studies. By so doing they will become better armed mentally and be able to defeat the enemy.

Long live the victory of the Seventh Congress of our Party!

Long live Comrade Mao Zedong, leader of our Party!

Long live the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the South China Anti-Japanese Column!

Unite with all the friendly forces to defeat the Japanese invaders!

Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

Long live the independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and powerful new China!